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A DIVISIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE
FEDERAL APPEALS COURTS

Carl Tobias·

The 106th Congress seriously considered proposed legislation that could
profoundly affect the federal appellate courts, and the 107th Congress may well do
so. 1 The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
which performed a rather comprehensive, albeit incomplete, study of the tribunals,
recommended this bill as the centerpiece of its report for Congress.2 The
commissioners prescribed regionally-based adjudicative divisions for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and for the remaining appellate
courts when the courts increase in size, even as the commission decisively r~ected
the possibility of splitting the Ninth Circuit into multiple courts. The
commissioners suggested that each of three divisions, with a majority of the
division's judges resident in the specific area, exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from district courts situated there and proposed a Circuit Division that
would resolve conflicting opinions which the three entities issue. The commission
asserted that this approach would enhance the consistency and coherence of circuit
law, promote genuine judicial collegiality and link the appellate forum more
closely to the region served.4

*
Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas. I wish to thank Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable
suggestions, Sue Niehoff for processing this piece and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing
support. Errors that remain are mine.
1.
See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999); see also COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR TiiE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPoRT 93 (1998) (providing the
suggested statute on which senators premised the proposed legislation that they introduced
in January 1999), available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/finaUappstruc.pdf [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT]; infra note 3.
2.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 93; see also WIWAM H.
REHNQUIST, 1999 YEAR-END REPORT ON TiiE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2 (1999) (urging Congress
to give the "recommendations full and complete consideration'').
3.
See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at ix-xi, 29, 41-46, 60-62. Despite
commission rejection of this prospec~ senators offered a circuit-splitting bill in March 2000.
See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000). Senators and representatives introduced similar propoSlls in
spring 2001. See S. 346, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1203, 107th Cong. (2001).
4.
See COMt.fiSSION REPoRT, supra note 1, at x, 41-46.
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The commission deserves substantial credit for carefully evaluating the
appeals courts and for developing recommendations that constitute a pragmatic
political compromise. Should the divisional arrangement enable the Ninth Circuit
to improve the quality of case resolution without disrupting daily operations, the
organizational scheme might also afford an effective alternative for the other
appellate courts as they expand. The remedy that the commissioners crafted could
even be responsive to the dramatic docket growth which has transformed the
appeals courts from the institutions that the tribunals were only a generation ago.
However, the commission did not systematically collect, analyze and
synthesize empirical data that show persuasively, much less definitively, that the
appellate courts have encountered or now experience difficulties that are
sufficiently problematic to warrant treatment. Indeed, the commissioners

forthrightly acknowledged that they lacked adequate time to conduct n
"statistically meaningful analysis" of the Ninth Circuit, even as the commission
members found that each of the appeals courts operates efficaciously. 5 Those
candid admissions make particularly compelling the inadvisability of implementing
solutions which seem as drastic and potentially ineffective as the divisional
concept. All of these propositions mean that the report and suggestions that the
commissioners recently issued deserve assessment. This Article undertakes that
effort.
I initially trace the historical developments which prompted the 1OS th
Congress to authorize the establishment of the Commission on Stmctural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. The paper then scmtinizes the
entity's report and proposals and determines that the evidence the commission
marshaled fails to support change that appears as inefficacious as the divisional
structure in entities, which are as important as the appellate courts. The piece
concludes by recommending that members of Congress approve additional study
of the appeals courts and that the Ninth Circuit continue its experimentation with
measures that promise to improve the appellate system.

I. AUTHORIZATION OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals resulted from protracted, ongoing debate over the wisdom of dividing the
Ninth Circuit. The origins and development of the prolonged, continuing
controversy might seem to require relatively little examination in this Article
because certain, significant aspects of the dispute have been rather thoroughly
chronicled elsewhere.6 Nevertheless, considerable treatment of the most relevant

5.

See id. at 29, 39.
6.
See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why /he
Proposal to Divide the United States Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a
Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circ11ilSplitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995) [hereinafter Tobias, Impoverished]; see generally
THOMAS

E. BAKER, JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE
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features in the first and second sections of the paper is justified, as that type of
explanation can infonn understanding of the report and suggestions which the
commissioners published.
Since the federal appellate system's creation, Ninth Circuit magnitudeincluding its twenty-eight active appeals court judges, 8700 annual filings and
enonnous geographic scope-has provoked calls for realignment because the
court's size has purportedly fostered inefficient, disunifonn and erroneous
appellate decisionmaking.7 The most recent, serious attempts to reconfigure the
Ninth Circuit commenced during 1983; lawmakers who favor realignment have
orchestrated numerous campaigns to restructure the court since then.8
The latest major effort was in 1995, when senators who principally
represent the jurisdictions of the Pacific Northwest introduced proposed legislation
that would have divided the Ninth Circuit9 During the initial session of the 104th
Congress, the United States Senate Judiciary Committee approved a measure
10
which would have realigned the court However, the bill's proponents could not
muster the votes necessary for adoption by the entire Senate and evinced
willingness to support a compromise recommendation, which would have
authorized a national commission that would study the appellate courts. 11 The
United States House of Representatives failed to pass substantive legislation which
would have approved the analysis, but the chamber appropriated $500,000 for an
assessment 12
Early in the first session of the 105th Congress, senators and
representatives offered measures that would have divided the Ninth Circuit or that

PROBLEMS OF TIIB U.S. CoUR'IS OF APPEALS (1994) [hereinafter BAKER, RATIONING
JUSTICE].
7.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 30-33; see generally NINTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, S. REP. No. 104-197 (1995)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. Senate Bills 2184 and 346 as well as House Bill 1203
represent the most recent efforts.
8.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-34; see generally Carl Tobias,
Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REY. 189, 196-214
(1997) [hereinafter Tobias, Suggestions].
9.
See S. 956, l04th Cong. (1995); see generally Diannuid F. O'Scannlain, A
Ninth Circuit Study Commission: Now Wltat?, 57 MONT. L. REv. 313, 313-15 (1996);
Tobias, Impoverished, supra note 6.
10.
See S. 956; SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 104TH CONG., MARKUP OF S. 956
(Comm. Print 1995); see generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 7; Jennifer E. Spreng, The

Icebox Cometh: A Fornier Clerk's View oftlze Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 13 WASH. L.
REV. 875, 887 {1998).
11.
See 142 CONG. REc. S2544, S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996); see generally
Carl Tobias, A Proposal to Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 279
(1996).
12
See 142 CONG. R.Ec. Hl 1,164, HI 1,859 {daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996); see
generally Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: Tlte Supreme Court, lite Ninth
Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 409 (1998).
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would have instituted a federal appeals court study. 13 On June 3, 1997, the House of
Representatives unanimously authorized an evaluation of the appellate system. 14
During August, lawmakers who advocated splitting the Ninth Circuit achieved
their greatest success when the Senate adopted an appropriations rider which
would have reconfigured the appellate court. 15 Nonetheless, members of the
House-including every Democrat and Republican from California as well as
Representative Henry Hyde (R-III.), Chair of the House Judiciary Committecopposed division, and Congress ultimately agreed to a compromise that approved

. a national examination. 16 The measure empowered the Chief Justice of the United
States to appoint the five members of the commission not later than thirty days

from November 26th, the date of the statute's enactment. 17 The legislation
accorded the commissioners ten months to "study the structure and alignment of
the Federal Court of Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth
Circuit," and two months to write a report that was to include proposals for such
"changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious
and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals,
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process." 18

II. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK
A. Backgrou11d
The commission members appeared to discharge conscientiously the
significant statutory duties which lawmakers had assigned the entity. 19 Throughout
1998, the commissioners sought considerable public input. During the spring of
that year, the commission held six public hearings at which eighty - nine witnesses
testified in major metropolitan areas across the country: Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago,
New York, Seattle and San Francisco.2 Five of these cities function as the
headquarters for regional circuits. Atlanta and Dallas serve as the respective
headquarters of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, which Congress created from the
fonner Fifth Circuit in 1980, and San Francisco has been, and remains, the
headquarters of the Ninth Circuit. Seattle would probably be the headquarters of

°

13.
See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 908,
105th Cong. (1997); see also Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 205-14 (analyzing
developments in the 105th Congress).
14.
See H.R. 908; 143 CONG. REC. H3223, H3225 (daily ed. June 3, 1997).
15.
See S. 1022, § 305, lOSth Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REc. S8041 et seq.
(daily ed. July 24, 1997).
16.
See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2240, 2491 (1997); infra notes
27-28 and accompanying text.
17.
See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a)(2)(A)-(B).
18.
Id. § 305(a)(I)(B); see also Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 205-14
(analyzing measure).
19.
I rely substantially in tbis subsection on COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1,
at 1-6.
See id. at 2-3.
20.
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any new Twelfth Circuit that lawmakers might carve out of the existing Ninth
Circuit.
The commissioners also worked quite closely with the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the
principal research and administrative anus of the federal courts, which senators
21
and representatives wisely empowered the commission to consult. Indeed,
several employees of the Judicial Center and of the Administrative Office, who
served as expert advisors for the commissioners, had actively participated in
previous assessments that were performed on the federal judicial system. More
specifically, the commission members drew substantially on the experience of two
seasoned FJC personnel in designing surveys which the commissioners circulated
to circuit and district court judges and to ap~llate practitioners seeking their
viewpoints related to appeals courts' operations.
The commission as well collected certain statistical information regarding
the performance and administration of the regional circuits. For example, the
commissioners gathered material (1) on the percentage of filings which the
appeals courts accord thorough judicial consideration, especially in the form of
oral arguments and written dispositions; (2) on the time that the circuits require to
resolve cases; and (3) on the mechanisms that appellate courts have employed to
treat the steadily expanding dockets that have dramatically changed the circuits
from the entities which the appeals courts were even during the 1970s.23
The commission evaluated all of the information it bad assembled or had
received and on October 7, 1998, the commissioners published a tentative draft
report \vith suggestions on which they solicited public input during a month-long
24
comment period. Numerous individuals and interests that the commission draft
findings and recommendations would affect offered favorable responses, but a
substantially greater number of commentors tendered submissions that criticized
those determinations and proposals. Indeed, people and entities ranging across a
broad spectrum-as diverse as the American Bar Association, the United States
Department of Justice, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund and the chief judges of
seven regional circuits-expressed dissatisfaction.25 After the commissioners
21.
See id. at 3-4; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994) (authorizing the
Administrative Office); 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (1994) (authorizing the FJC); Pub. L. No.
105-119, § 305(a)(4)(D) (authorizing the FJC to provide the commission research services
and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to provide the commission administrative
services).
22.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 4.
23.
See id. at 21-25, 39; see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITIEE 109 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. REP.] (suggesting that
caseload increases have transformed the circuits).
24.
See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF
APPEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT 3 (1998).
25.
See ABA, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 6, 1998); HARRY EDWARDS ET AL., COMMENTS TO THE
COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. CoURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 10,
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examined the public comments, the commission members made comparatively
minor revisions in the tentative draft document and issued a final report on
December 18.26
The final commission report is replete with ironies. The very existence of
the commission itself is ironic. Had the unanimous United States House of
Representatives delegation from California and Ninth Circuit Judge Charles
Wiggins, who served on the House Judiciary Committee during the Watergate
controversy with Representative Henry Hyde, not prevailed on the Chair of the
Judiciary Committee, Congress might never have authorized the commission.27 If
the members of Congress from California and Judge Wiggins had failed to
intercede with Representative Hyde, the House of Representatives could well have
followed the lead of the Senate, which in August 1997 adopted fifty-five to fortyfive, along strict political party lines, an appropriations rider that would have
divided the Ninth Circuit. 28
The senators, who were the foremost advocates of circuit-splitting and
who principally represented states situated in the Pacific Northwest, reluctantly
agreed to a national assessment when they apparently realized that some form of
study would be a condition precedent to any reconfiguration of the Ninth Circuit.
Lawmakers struck several important compromises in the appropriations measure,
which authorized the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals. 29 Senatorial proponents of the Ninth Circuit's division
seemingly insisted that (1) the Chief Justice of the United States, William H.
Rehnquist, be authorized to name all of the commissioners; (2) that the commission
consist of only five members; (3) that the commissioners have ten months for
undertaking the appellate court evaluation and two months for compiling their
report and suggestions; and (4) that the commission have a $900,000 budget to
complete the analysis. 30
These determinations may have foreordained the result that the
commissioners would ultimately reach. Chief Justice Rehnquist chose as members
retired Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White, Sixth Circuit Judge Gilbert S.
1998); TODD D. TRUE, EARTHJUSTICE LEGAL DEF. FUND, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON
STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 6, 1998); U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED.
COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS].
26.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I. I rely in the remainder of this
subsection on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the
developments described.
27.
See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Comm., to
Rep. Robert Livingston, Chair, House Comm. on Appropriations (Sept. 5, 1997); Letter
from Rep. Jeny Lewis et al., Members of Congress from California, to Rep. Harold Rogers,
Chair, House Appropriations Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State (Oct. 17, 1997).
28.
See sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text.
29.
See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2240, 2491 (1997).
30.
See id.; see also Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 205-14 (analyzing the
measure).
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Merritt, Ninth Circuit Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, District Judge William D.
Browning of Arizona and immediate past American Bar Association President N.
Lee Cooper.31 This composition suggested that the commissioners would proffer a
report and proposals that were comparatively solicitous of, or would at least be
palatable to, the federal judiciary. Congress astutely appropriated quite generous
resources of $900,000 that theoretically could have enabled the commission to
conduct a comprehensive assessment32 However, senators and representatives
assigned the very small number of commissioners a potentially enormous task
while affordinf them woefully inadequate time to conclude all of the work that
was entailed.3 For example, the commission had a shorter time period for
examining the appellate courts than a majority of those circuits requires to resolve
34
an appeal, as well as somewhat less time and significantly fewer members than
comparable, earlier entities, such as the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission), the Federal Courts Study
Committee and the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of
35
the United States. These circumstances may have substantially restricted what the
commissioners could accomplish.
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals carefully attempted to fulfill the onerous statutory responsibilities
imposed by lawmakers in the extremely limited period that had been provided.
The commission members gathered substantial, relevant information on the
appellate courts, broadly solicited public input, identified the most important
difficulties that the circuits ostensibly are experiencing and developed apparently
efficacious solutions for those complications. Notwithstanding the commission's
concerted efforts, its endeavor eventually proved deficient. The commissioners
ultimately failed to assemble, evaluate and synthesize convincing empirical material
that showed with adequate certainty that the appellate courts presently encounter
difficulties problematic enough to warrant treatment, especially with measures that
appeared as potentially ineffective as the approaches which the commission
proposed.

31.

32.
33.
34.

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at l, 92.
See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305 (b).
See id. § 305(a)(6).
See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF

APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 97 tbl. 5 (1998); U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, MEDIAN TIME
INTERVALS IN CASES TERMINATED AFTER HEARING OR SUBMISSION, BY CIRCUIT DURING THE
TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DEC. 31, 2000.
35.
See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. REP., supra note 23; JUDICIAL COXF. OF
THE U.S. CoMM. ON LoNG RANGE PLANNING, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]; U.S. COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT
APP. SYS., THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 62 F.R.D. 223, 228-30 (1973) [hereinafter HRUSKA
COMM'N].
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B. Problems i11 lde11tifying the Problems
First, and perhaps foremost, the comm1ss1on did not conclusively
demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit or the remaining appeals courts presently face
complications that are sufficiently troubling to deserve remediation. The
commissioners expressly declared in the final report that they found 11no
persuasive evidence that the Ninth Circuit (or any other circuit, for that matter) is
not working effectively."36
The commission capably summarized the various assertions and
counterclaims which those individuals and interests that favor and oppose Ninth
Circuit bifurcation have articulated in the protracted, continuing controversy over
possible division. 37 The arguments involve the impacts of the court of appeals' size,
the substantial geographic jurisdiction of the circuit and the place of this entity
within the federal appellate system. The commissioners cataloged the principal
relevant issues but decided against dissecting them in much detail because the
commission contended that the ideas were readily available in the literature the
commissioners had scrutinized.
The commission then canvassed the perspectives of Ninth Circuit judges,
the consumers of the court's services and additional, knowledgeable observers.
The commissioners seemed particularly impressed with the opinions espoused by
numerous members of the United States Supreme Court, four of whom asserted
that it was "time for a change."38 Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra
Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and John Paul Stevens generally voiced concerns
about the capacity of the Ninth Circuit judges to keep abreast of the court's
jurisprudence, the danger of intracircuit inconsistency in a court which processes
such an enormous caseload, and the ability of the limited en bane procedure that
the circuit employs to address disuniformity.39 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
shared these and other viewpoints expressed by his colleagues and who
characterized the divisional concept as better than a mere compromise between
circuit-splitting champions and proponents of the status quo, claimed that the
divisional approach appeared "to address head-on most of the significant concerns
raised about the court and would do so with minimal to no disruption in the
circuit's administrative structure.,,40
36.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
37.
I rely in this paragraph on id. at 34-37. For similar summaries, see SENATE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-11, 16-31; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 928-45;
Tobias, Impoverished, supra note 6, at 1377-95.
38.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-39; see also infra notes 48-49
and accompanying text (analyzing surveys of other consumers).
39.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-39; see also infra notes 91, 97,
132-33 and accompanying text (analyzing similar expressions of concern).
40.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 2.
It is unclear why the commission seemed to assign these ideas so much weight. The Justices
may have no special expertise in appeals court dispute resolution and are relatively removed
from daily circuit operations. In fairness, much of the Court's current docket comprises
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The commissioners next explored several standards that they believed
inform the lengthy, controversial and ongoing regarding the future of the Ninth
41
Circuit The commission stated that the contentions propounded by advocates
and opponents of change include significant objective and subjective constituents,
which the commissioners carefully surveyed in reaching their detenninations
related to the court's present circumstances. The commission reviewed "all of the
available objective data routinely used in court administration to measure the
performance and efficiency of the federal appellate courts.'AZ However, the
commissioners forthrightly admitted that they could "not say that the statistical
criteria tip decisively in one direction or the other.'.43 Although the commission
found certain discrepancies among the various indicia deployed by assessors when
evaluating the appeals courts, "differences in judicial vacancy rates, caseload mix,
and operatin~rocedures make it impossible to attribute them to any single factor
such as size.'
The commission observed that subjective considerations, namely the
consistency and predictability of law, are obviously more difficult to analyi;e "but
45
are widely regarded as a high priority for" the appellate courts. The
commissioners frankly aclmowledged that they "could not possibly have
undertaken a statistically meaningful analysis of opinions as well as unpublished
dispositions, dissents, and petitions for rehearing en bane to make our O\'m,
objective determination of how the Ninth Circuit" compares with the remaining
appeals courts in the truncated time allocated by Congress.46 The commission
members concomitantly stated that they were aware of certain, relevant literature,
"including a study that concluded that intracircuit conflict was not characteristic of
the published opinions of the Ninth Circuit during the mid-1980s.•A 7 However, the
commissioners apparently accorded this evaluation little credence.

appeals from these courts. Moreover, Justice O'Connor is the Supreme Court member who
has responsibility for the Ninth Circuit and Justice Kennedy was a judge of the court, while
Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens formerly served on the appeals courts.
41.
I rely in this paragraph on COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
42.
Id.; see also Hon. Procter Hug, Jr., Tlze Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 51
MONT. L. REV. 291, 296-99 (1996) (reviewing earlier objective data); Hon. J. Clifford
Wallace, Tlze Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 941, 942 (1995) (same).
43.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
44.
Id.; see also infra notes 139, 156 and accompanying text (analyzing the
Ninth Circuit).
45.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. For analyses of the two
phenomena, see Aaron H. Caplan, Malthus and the Court of Appeals: Another Former
Clerk Looks at the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 957, 981-84 (1998);
Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57
MONT. L. REY. 261, 274-79 (1996).
46.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. For suggestions that Congress
allotted the commission little time, see JUSTICE DEPT. CoMMENTS, supra note 25, at 1 and
Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 191.
47.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39 n.93; see also Wallace, supra note
42, at 943 (remarking on the study); infra note 114 (citing to the study).
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The commissioners did comment that the surveys, which the commission
had prepared with the assistance of Federal Judicial Center personnel and had
circulated to district judges and appellate attorneys in the Ninth Circuit and the
other appeals courts, asked for these jurists' and lawyers' perspectives and
48
experiences as the principal consumers of appeals court decisions. Nevertheless,
the survey results compiled by the commissioners eventually proved to be rather
inconclusive. For instance, district judges situated in the Ninth Circuit reported
finding the law sufficiently clear to give the jurists confidence in their
detenninations on legal questions as frequently as the trial judges' counterparts in
the remaining appellate courts, but counsel who practice in the Ninth Circuit
reported "somewhat more difficulty discerning circuit law and predicting
9
outcomes of appeals than lawyers elsewhere.',4

Of course, the commission assumed that the viewpoints expressed by
these consumers of Ninth Circuit decisionmaking would be instructive and
accurate. However, the opinions of certain district court judges and lawyers who
pursue cases in the Ninth Circuit could be colored by their personal experiences
and self-interest and possibly by a lack of confidence in, or even a distrust of, the
appellate bench. Perhaps in recognition that reliance on the Ninth Circuit
consumers might be vulnerable to criticism, the commissioners candidly remarked
that "when all is said and done, neither we nor, we believe, anyone else, can
reduce consistency and predictability to statistical analysis. These concepts are too
subtle, the decline in quality too incremental, and the effects of size too difficult to
isolate, to allow evaluation in a freeze-framed moment." 50
Having made this comparatively telling concession and apparently
appreciating the somewhat tepid character of the support mustered, the
commissioners, nonetheless, went on to proclaim that in the "common-law system,
consistency and predictability have to do with the coherence of the law declared
over time."51 The commission correspondingly observed that because groups of
three judges working together in panels typically determine the law on an aEpeals
court, the appellate process places a premium on collegial deliberations. 2 The
commissioners specifically admitted that collegiality clearly "cannot be quantified

48.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 39.
49.
Id. at 40; see also Hug, supra note 42, at 303-06 (suggesting that the Ninth
Circuit is responsive to the consumers ofits services).
50.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 40.
51.
Id.; see also sources cited supra note 45 (analyzing consistency and
predictability). For a critique of the ideas in this paragraph, see Arthur D. Hellman, The
Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 13 S.
CAL. L. REV. 377, 393-401 (2000).
52.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 40. For analyses of collegiality,
see O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 315 and infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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or measured and [made] no attempt to do so with respect to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals or any other."53 The commission then proceeded to declare its
judgment that the consistent, predictable, coherent development of
the law over time is best fostered in a decisional unit that is small
enough for the kind of close, continual, collaborative decision
making that "seeks the objective of as much excellence in a group's
decision as its combined talents, experience, and energy permit."54

The lack of clarity accompanying the commissioners' identification of
those complications presently confronted by federal intermediate appellate courts
is so important that the notions espoused warrant reiteration. The commission initially
consulted all of the applicable objective data ordinarily employed by assessors of
federal court administration in evaluating the performance and efficiency of the
appeals courts and found this material to be inconclusive. The commissioners then
considered subjective factors, such as consistency, coherence, collegiality, certainty
and predictability. The commission members conceded that those elements are quite
difficult to analyze and that the commission lacked adequate time to conduct a
statistically meaningful assessment of Ninth Circuit decisionmaking to formulate
its own, objective evaluation of how this particular court operates. Instead, the
commissioners resorted to, and relied substantially upon, surveys of the
viewpoints of district judges and appellate practitioners as the primary consumers
of circuit determinations, although most of the consumers' responses appeared
relatively uninformative and, in any event, had somewhat limited value because
they were effectively the opinions of self-interested observers. The commission
evidenced cogniz.ance of the only systematic examination of Ninth Circuit
precedent, which found that conflicts did not characterize the published
determinations of this appeals court in the mid-1980s. However, the
commissioners claimed that neither the commission nor anybody else could reduce
uniformity and predictability to very exacting statistical measurement.55
Undaunted by the paucity of information elicited and the apparent weakness of the
evidence which the commissioners had adduced, they contended that consistency
and predictability implicate the coherence oflaw declared by appellate judges over
time and that group decisionmaking on the appeals courts enhances the importance
of collegiality. Finally, the commission acknowledged that collegiality obviously
resists precise quantification or measurement and undertook no effort to quantify
or calculate the concept's operation in the Ninth Circuit or in the remaining appellate
courts. Nevertheless, the commissioners declared their unsubstantiated judgment
that the uniform, predictable and coherent development of the law across time can

53.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11 at 40; see also Hug, supra note 42, at
299-300 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit is collegial); Spreng, supra note 10, at 922-24
(suggesting that the Ninth Circuit is not collegial).

54.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40 (quoting FRANK COFFIN,
APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 215 (1994)).
55.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40; see also supra note 50
accompanying text (providing earlier analysis of ideas).
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be promoted best in a decisional entity that is sufficiently small for the type of
intimate, ongoin~, collaborative interaction that cultivates excellent appellate
decisionmaking. 6 Perhaps most striking about this proposition, which constitutes
the linchpin of the determinations and proposals that the commissioners
developed, and about numerous other assertions articulated by the commission is
the sheer lack of support proffered for the notions. Indeed, the commissioners
explicitly admitted that their comprehensive review of the relevant objective
information and applicable subjective phenomena-including consistency,
certainty and collegiality-yielded essentially inconclusive results, particularly in
terms of attempting to correlate deficient appeals court perfonnance with circuit
size. In the final analysis, the contentions of the commission that the appellate
courts were encountering difficulties problematic enough to deserve treatment
with the divisional arrangement appear as unsubstantiated as the assertions are
magisterial in their tone.
C. Problems in Identifying the Solutions

Once the members of the commission had closely "considered all of the
arguments, evidence, the many helpful statements that were submitted," as well as
their own personal experiences, the commission decided to recommend that
"Congress and the President by statute restructure the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit into three regionally-based adjudicative divisions [and] create a
Circuit Division for conflict correction to resolve any conflicts that arise from
different decisions of the three regional divisions. "57 These suggestions reflected
careful assessment by the commissioners of the circumstances of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals today as well as predictions related to particular appeals court and
the remaining appellate courts as they increase in magnitude over time. 58 The
commission proposed that the legislative and executive branches organize the
Ninth Circuit into three regionally-premised adjudicative divisions which would
hear and resolve each case appealed from a federal district court in the specific
division. The commissioners also recommended that senators and representatives
seriously consider prescribing similar arrangements for the other appellate courts
as the courts expand during the twenty-first century.
The commission members suggested that the Northern Division for the
Ninth Circuit include the Federal Districts of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and
56.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 40; see also supra note 54 and
accompanying text (providing earlier analysis of ideas).
57.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40. For critiques of the solutions, sec
Hellman, supra note 51, at 381-93; Federal Courts-Proposed Changes to the Ninth
Circuit and the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 113 HARV. L. REV. 822 (2000).
58.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-41. The commissioners,
recognizing that Congress might reject their proposal and divide the circuit, analyzed a
dozen circuit-splitting plans and found that they all lacked merit. The commission then
scrutinized three "arguable" plans, but it considered them flawed and endorsed none. See id.
at 52-57; see also HRUSKA COMM'N, supra note 35, at 234-43 (analyzing these and other
plans); O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 317-19 (same).
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Eastern and Western Washington.59 The Middle Division proposed would consist
of the Federal Districts of Eastern and Northern California, Hawaii, Nevada,
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. The Southern Division would encompass
the Federal Districts of Arizona and Central and Southern California. The
commissioners recommended that every circuit judge in active status be assigned

to a particular regional division, that individual divisions be comprised of at least
seven active appellate judges and that the precise number of divisional members
be commensurate with applicable caseload requirements in the specific
divisions.60 The commission concomitantly suggested that a majority of judges
reside in those federal districts over which their divisions exercised jurisdiction
but that each of the divisions include some non-resident judges who would be
61
stationed there for terms of at least three years.
The commissioners Eroposed that all of the divisions function as semiautonomous decisional units. 2 The commission recommended that the judges in
every division resolve appeals with three-judge panels and sit en bane to discharge
the responsibilities that Congress presently assigns by statute to an existing court
of appeals en bane. With the establishment of the divisions, current Ninth Circuit
precedent would continue to operate as the governing law throughout the circuit;
only the divisional en bane process within a particular division could overrule
existing precedents of the Ninth Circuit and divisional decisions. Opinions of one
division would not bind the remaining divisions; however, the commissioners
admonished that appellate judges accord the decisions substantial weight as the
jurists attempt to maintain uniform circuit law.
The commission specifically conceded that the suggestion for placing large
portions of California in different divisions might elicit concerns related to forum
shopping and that the proposal could expose people and entities that must comply
with California law to potentially divergent federal authority.63 Nonetheless, the
commissioners asserted that the proposal would not promote markedly greater
federal forum shopping than currently occurs and that the recommended Circuit
Division would afford a more expeditious means of resolving inconsistencies

59.
I rely in this paragraph on COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 1, at 41-44; see
also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Northern Division would
resemble the proposed Twelfth Circuit which congressional circuit-splitting proponents
advocated).
60.
See CoMMISS!ON REPORT, supra note 1, at 43; see also Hug, supra note 42, at
307 (suggesting that the number of judges authorized for the projected Twelfth Circuit by
proposed legislation in the 104th Congress would not have been commensurate with
caseload demands).
61.
See COMI\fiSSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
62.
I rely in this paragraph on id.
63.
I rely in this paragraph on id. at 43-44; see also HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra
note 35, at 23HO (earlier study suggesting that Congress place C3lifomia's federal
districts in different circuits); see generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems ofDividing
a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1195 (1974).
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attributable to forum shopping.64 The commission explained that, once a particular
regional division speaks on an issue of law, the district courts over which the
specific division has jurisdiction would be bound by the determination,
notwithstanding decisions of other divisions. 65 However, the commissioners
claimed that their contemplated Circuit Division should guarantee that
disuniformity regarding questions important to circuit-wide consistency would not
persist for a prolonged period. 66 The commission elaborated the concept of the
Circuit Division "for conflict correction, whose sole mission would be to resolve
67
conflicting decisions between the regional divisions." The entity would consist
of thirteen judges, including the chief judge of the Ninth Circuit and twelve active
appellate judges chosen by lot in equal numbers from the three regional divisions. 68
The Circuit Division would have discretionary jurisdiction, which a party to a case
could invoke after a panel determination in a particular division had received
divisional en bane review or the litigant had requested, and the division had denied,
such review.69 The jurisdiction of the Circuit Division would encompass those
appeals that the entity concludes raise "square interdivisional conflicts."70 The
Circuit Division would lack authority to consider an allegedly unsound or
incorrect decision issued by a regional division; only the regional division en bane
or the United States Supreme Court could review such a determination. 71 The
suggestion proposed by the commissioners would abolish the circuit-wide en bane
process and the special statutory provision for limited en bane panels in appeals
courts with more than fifteen active circuitjudges. 72
The regional divisions would function pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure as well as those local circuit rules and internal operating
procedures promulgated by the court of appeals, but individual regions would not
64.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-44; see also Diarmuid
O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split is Inevitable, But Not Imminent, 56 OHIO ST. L. J, 947,
950 (1995) (analyzing similar ideas). For trenchant critiques of the commission decision to
place California in different divisions, see Los ANGELES COUNIT BAR ASS'N, COMMENTS
TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 4,
1998); SHIRLEY M. HUFSTEDLER, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Oct. 23, 1998).
65.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.

66.

See id.

67.
I rely in the remainder of this paragraph on id. at 45-46; see also infra notes
82-86 and accompanying text (analyzing the jurisdiction that the commission would afford
the Circuit Division).
68.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 45; see also infra note 135 and
accompanying text (suggesting a similar approach).
69.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46.
70.
Id.
71.
See id.; see also infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (analyzing the
jurisdiction that the commission would afford the Circuit Division).
72.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46; see also Act of Oct. 20,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (authorizing circuits to apply the limited
en bane process); 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (implementing the limited en bane process); infra notes
96-97 and accompanying text (analyzing consumer views of the limited en bane process).
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be allowed to prescribe their own distinctive local rules or internal operating
procedures.73 Local rules that the court of appeals adopts would correspondingly
govern administration of the Circuit Division.
D. Problems witlt tlte Solutions Proposed

Despite the commissioners' good faith efforts to analyze the most
compelling problems that the Ninth Circuit and the remaining appeals courts
purportedly encounter and to formulate responsive solutions, the remedial scheme
that the commission recommended might well prove ineffective. One crucial reason
for this apparent inefficacy is that the federal appellate judiciary has never actually
implemented the divisional approach suggested by the commissioners.
Nevertheless, during the late 1970s, two appeals courts did conduct
comparatively limited experimentation with mechanisms somewhat analogous to the
commission's divisional arrangement The Fifth Circuit briefly applied a divisional
concept under which the "rules of stare decisis behind the concept of the law of
the circuit became so complicated that they nearly defied description." The Ninth
Circuit employed for five months a regional calendering system that members of
the appellate court thought reduced judicial collegiality, threatened the coherence
of circuit law, encouraged counsel and parties to forum shop, saved the jurists
relatively little travel time and led circuit members who were "accustomed to
sitting with a larger and more diverse group of judges" to experience "panel
fever."74 Insofar as it is possible to predict exactly how the commission divisional
scheme will work in practice, the remedy would seemingly be infeasible. This
proposal might even exacerbate the precise difficulties that the solution was
designed to rectify and, therefore, have effects that diametrically oppose the goals
the commission members intended to achieve. Indeed, the divisional organization

may well have been flawed in its conceptualization.
A :fundamental, ·specific complication with the commissioners'
recommendation was their decision to jettison the longstanding, effective concept
of circuit-wide stare decisis. 75 The commission expressly and forcefully
I rely in this paragraph on COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 1, at 46-47.
THOMAS E. BAKER, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 2, 1998) (analyzing Fifth Circuit);
see also Public Hearing Before Comm'n on Structural Alterantivcs for the Fed. Courts of
Appeal (May 29, 1998) (statement of James R. Browning, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) (analyzing Ninth Circuit); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
1, at 50 (same and affording Ninth Circuit quotation). Panel fever is the discomfort that
judges experience when they sit with a smaller, Jess diverse group ofjudges.
75.
I rely here and in the remainder of this subsection on ARTHUR D. HEU.MAN,
COMMENTS TO TiiE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF
APPEALS (Nov. 4, 1998); Hellman, supra note 51; HON. PROCTER R. HUG, JR., Co:-.tMENTS
TO THE CoMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURT OF APPEALS (Oct. 27,
1998); Hon. Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Stroct11ral Altematfres for the Federal
73.
74.

Courts of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of tlze Commission's Recommendations for
the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 887 (1999) [hereinafter Hug, Analysis].
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acknowledged the importance of maintaining uniform federal law related to
matters such as the commercial and maritime regime that governs relations with
the countries of the Pacific Rim, which significantly affect the entire Pacific region
and the western United States.76 However, this laudable objective would be
frustrated under a system in which the determinations issued by a particular
division would have no binding effect on the other two divisions. The commission
did contemplate that the members of each division would accord the remaining
divisions' opinions "substantial weight as the judges of the circuit endeavor to
77
keep circuit law consistent." Divisional members could often do so in the same
manner as appeals court judges, who currently respect decisions which other
circuits publish. Nonetheless, suggesting that appellate court members defer to
precedent is different from requiring the jurists to follow case law, and this
distinction will operate when the difference is most salient.
Today, three-judge panels of the regional circuits occasionally distinguish
precedents in a manner unconvincing to their colleagues on the appeals or district
court bench or unpersuasive to attorneys who practice before the federal courts,
although this happens rather infrequently.78 Moreover, most appellate judges
follow precedents with which they may actually disagree because the jurists
believe that they are obligated to exercise deference. The abandonment of circuitwide stare decisis could make it easier for judges to disregard precedent that
applies in the remaining divisions. The commission recommendation, accordingly,
would authorize, and might even invite, inconsistent intracircuit decisionmaking.

The development by the commissioners of a Circuit Division that would
treat interdivisional conflicts may be insufficiently responsive to the dilemma of
inconsistency, and the approach proffered seemingly fails to clarify several unclear
issues.79 Notwithstanding commission protestations to the contrary, the
commissioners' contemJ>lated mechanism would actually establish another tier in
the appellate judiciary.80 Because the commission's suggested statute would
expressly authorize the Circuit Division to review final decisions of the three
regional divisions, the Circuit Division would not simply be a replacement for the
81
existing limited en bane procedure, as the commissioners contend. The en bane
tribunal presently reviews the determination of the federal district court, not the
judgment of the three-judge panel.

76.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 49-50; see also Hug, supra note
42, at 298 (expressing similar sentiments).
77.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 43; see also Wallace, supra note 42, at
944 (expressing similar sentiments).
78.
I rely in this paragraph on Hellman, supra note 45, at 277-78; HELLMAN
COMMENTS, supra note 75.
79.
I rely in this paragraph on HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75.
80.
See id.; see also HUFSTEDLER COMMENTS, supra note 64 (providing similar
views); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 45-46 (providing the commission view).
81.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at45, 94-95.
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Perhaps most troubling is the commission designation of the jurisdiction
that would be exercised by the Circuit Division. The commissioners would restrict
the Circuit Division to resolving "square interdivisional conflicts.'.82 This
delineation apparently means that the Circuit Division could only review decisions
of a panel in one division which expressly refused to follow the determinations of
another division. If the proposition above is accurate, the jurisdictional grant that
the commission members envisioned would not empower the Circuit Division to

address tensions in circuit law, which are attributable to less patent conflicts in

results or doctrines, a procedure that the Ninth Circuit currently follows. 83

However, if a particular panel need not specifically reject the ruling of a
second division to invoke Circuit Division jurisdiction, this jurisdictional
arrangement would encourage counsel and parties to participate in incessant
argumentation, which implicates the meaning of inconsistency, and could
correspondingly foster unwarranted, expensive and time-consuming satellite
litigation involving comparatively refined distinctions. Considerable practical
experience with a somewhat analogous system of appellate review in the Florida
state court system fosters understanding of the difficulties that might materialize
were the Ninth Circuit to implement the jurisdictional scheme recommended by
the commissioners. The Florida Supreme Court is authorized to review a judgment
of a district court of appeals when the opinion "expressly and directly conflicts
with a decision of another district court of appeals ...on the same question of
law."84 Several legal commentators have characterized the jurisdictional
mechanism as disputatious and have determined that the presence of an
inconsistency can frequently be uncertain, which means that briefs filed by
attorneys and parties must present a "lengthier and more convoluted argument to
establish the Court's discretion over the case.',ss Thus, although the
commissioners' Circuit Division concept may not necessarily be a prescription for
disaster, one expert student of the Ninth Circuit has astutely observed that the
approach envisioned is hardly a model to be emulated, while another scholar of the
court perceptively remarked that he was less sanguine than the commission that
the differences between review of panel decisions for conflict resolution or review
because of importance or mistake are "easily made and readily distinguishable.,.s6

The articulation that the commissioners proposed concomitantly leaves
unclear the scope of Circuit Division jurisdiction over those appeals the panel
82.
Id. at 45; cf. JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 25 (analyzing the tcnn's
meaning).
83.
See, e.g., Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1993) (en bane);
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane); see
generally Hug, Analysis, supra note 75, at 907.
84.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b}(3).
85.
Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction ofthe
Florida Supreme Court, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1151, 1238 (1994).
86.
HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75 (affording the view of the first scholar
that the approach is not to be emulated); see also BAKER COMMENTS, supra note 74
(affording the views of the second scholar who was less sanguine than the commission).
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chooses to entertain. 87 If the Circuit Division can only consider the particular issue
that produced the conflict, resolution might then be complicated by examination of

the specific matter apart from the remaining questions involved in the case.
However, could the Circuit Division resolve all of the issues that the appeal
presents, the entity would have expansive authority to enunciate circuit law for
questions that did not implicate the interdivisional inconsistency.
The commission suggestions that Congress eliminate the provision for
the circuit-wide limited en bane court and empower the three recommended
divisions to conduct en bane hearings may correspondingly have certain
detrimental effects.ss The requirement that parties request regional en bane
reconsideration before litigants seek Circuit Division review would postpone
ultimate appellate resolution and impose additional, unnecessary cost and delay.
Moreover, the regional en bane mechanism, by stamping an opinion with the
imprimatur of a particular division's judges, could solidify the divisional view
regarding a specific issue and, therefore, frustrate efforts to reattain uniformity
throughout the circuit. Perhaps the most ironic feature of the commissioners'
elegant divisional arrangement is that the approach constitutes the consummate
political compromise, even as the commission members clearly and powerfully
disavowed the relevance of politics to their report and proposals to the Ninth
Circuit and to the entire system:
There is one principle that we regard as undebatable: It is wrong to
realign circuits (or not realign them) and to restructure courts (or
leave them alone) because of particular judicial decisions or
particular judges. This rule must be faithfully honored, for the
independence of the judiciary is of constitutional dimension and
requires no less. 89

E. Problems with the Justificatio11s for the Solutions Proposed
The central premise of the assessment performed by the commission was
that "large appellate units have difficulty developing and maintaining consistent
and coherent Iaw."90 The commissioners grounded this critical proposition on
unspecified "perceptions of greater inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit than in most
[of the remaining appeals courts, which confirmed the members' own
unelaborated] judgment, based on experience," and on the combined volume of

decisions produced and on the judicial workload, which "make it impossible for
all of the court's judges to read all of the court's published opinions when they are
87.
I rely in this paragraph on HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75.
88.
See JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 25; supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
89.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 6; see generally SENATE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 8-9, 25-27; Caplan, supra note 51; Herald, supra note 12; O'Scannlain,
supra note 9.
90.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
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issued.',91 Especially troubling factors about the commission's assessment were
the dearth of particularity attending the commission perceptions, the lack of
elaboration on the commissioners' personal experiences and the unsubstantiated

assumptions that reviewing every detennination upon its publication is the only
way to keep fully informed of circuit precedent and that honoring this practice
would ineluctably foster uniformity and coherence. Procter R. Hug, Jr., who
served as the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit from 1996 until 2000, incisively
characterized as a "relic of the pre-computer era" the notion that appellate court
members cannot stay abreast of circuit law unless they scrutinize all of the court's
92
opinions when the determinations issue.
Similarly problematic were the commission's closely-related contentions
that ')udges operating in the [suggested] smaller decisional units .•.will find it
easier to monitor the law in their respective divisions and that those smaller
decisional units will thus promote greater consistency."93 Under the regime
recommended by the commissioners, judges should be able to follow more closely
intradivisional precedent; however, it remains unclear how the jurists can preserve
and increase circuit-wide uniformity without tracking the decisions published by
members of all three divisions. In short, the judges would not experience reduced
workloads because they would have to read the identical number of opinions.
The commission also asserted that appellate judges serving on larger
decisionmaking units encounter difficulties maintaining consistent and predictable
circuit precedent because they have fewer opportunities to sit together as the size
of the decisional entity increases.94 Nonetheless, the commission proffered no
persuasive evidence that more frequent interactions among circuit members, or
that appellate courts with smaller judicial complements, would foster enhanced
uniformity or predictability in the circuit's law.
Indeed, the only systematic evaluation of precedent's operation in the

Ninth Circuit contradicts the core proposition enunciated by the commissioners.
The commission effectively chose to deemphasize the analysis but rejected neither
the methodology of the study nor its conclusions.95 Quite troubling is the fact that
the major idea underlying the commission proposals apparently lacks much
support, particularly when the commission essentially ignored the most relevant,
albeit contradictory, information and could have rather readily assembled,
assessed and synthesized other applicable material. Illustrative is the notion that
substantial appeals courts experience problems developing and preserving
91.
Id.; see also O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 315-16 (providing similar ideas).
92.
HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75; see Letter from Chief Judge Procter Hug,
Jr., to Justice Byron R. White (Aug. 29, 1998).
93.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 47; but see Los ANGELES COUNTY
BARAsS'N COMMENTS, supra note 64; JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 25.
94.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 47; see also O'Scannlain, supra
note 9, at 315 (providing similar ideas).
95.
See supra notes 47, 55 and accompanying text; Hellman, supra note 51, at
397-98.
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consistent and coherent circuit law. The claim of inconsistency could be
empirically tested by comparing precedent in the larger and smaller appellate
courts.
The commission supplied no greater substantiation for the conclusion that
the limited en bane procedure employed by the Ninth Circuit during the last two
decades apparently precludes the effective discharge of the court's en bane
responsibilities. The commissioners frankly acknowledged that only a minority of
Ninth Circuit judges registered dissatisfaction with reliance on the limited en bane
technique to afford federal district judges and attorneys guidance, to correct
erroneous panel determinations, to resolve conflicts in circuit law, and to prevent
intercircuit inconsistency, while judges who serve on several other a1meals courts,
a few of which are small, reported similar or greater discontent. 96 Efforts to
analyze additional commission criticisms of the limited en bane mechanism are
frustrated because the commissioners merged their treatment of conflict resolution
and the correction of improper district court decisionmaking, even though such
responsibilities have very different ramifications for structural reform. Even had
the commission been clearer, some of the entity's contentions seem vulnerable to
attack. For instance, the commission members identified dissatisfaction with
respect to the infrequency of en bane rehearings vis-a-vis the perceived necessity
for reconsideration as well as the magnitude of the limited en bane court and the
97
manner in which this tribunal is constituted. However, the Ninth Circuit could
rather felicitously treat these criticisms by rehearing a larger number of cases or by
modifying the en bane court's composition without dismantling the comparatively
efficacious limited en bane process or risking the disru?ition and ineffectiveness
8
that the untested Circuit Division might entail.
The commissioners
correspondingly asserted that the divisional structure would relieve each judge of
having to monitor the decisional output of the entire Ninth Circuit. Nevertheless,
members of the court who fail to remain abreast of circuit precedent may
encounter complications fostering the increased uniformity and coherence that,
according to the commission members, are indispensable attributes of appeals
courts.
96.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48; COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 23-25 ( 1998); see also
Hellman, supra note 45, at 280-82 (analyzing the limited en bane). For analyses which
suggest that the limited en bane works well, see Caplan, supra note 45, at 972-74 and
Herald, supra note 12, at 476-81.
97.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48; see a/so SENATE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 10 (expressing similar dissatisfaction); Conrad Burns, Dividing the Ninth
Circuit Court ofAppeals: A Proposition Long Overdue, 51 MONT. L. REV. 244, 252 (1996)
(same); infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (suggesting possibly salutary changes in
the limited en bane).
98.
Indeed, the court has endorsed expansion of the en bane court's membership
and reduction of the votes needed to take a case en bane, actions which might increase the
number of en bane decisions. See NINTii CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT 2-6
(2000) (hereinafter EVALUATION COMM. INTERIM REPORT); Senate Bill 1403, 106th Cong.
(1999), which Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) introduced, embodies these ideas.
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The commissioners also maintained that the divisional nrrangement,
which would incorporate divisions comprising resident and nonresident judges,
would respect and heighten the regionalism, considered to be a desirable aspect of the
appellate system, without forfeiting the benefits of diversity provided by a tribunal
constituted from a significantly larger area.99 The commissioners further contended
that the divisional approach would capitalize on the full contingent of Ninth
Circuit judges, while restoring a sense of connection between the circuit and the
regions within the circuit by insuring that a majority of each division's members
resides in the jurisdictional geographic area. 100 The commission, therefore,
assumed that regionalism is a positive feature which has been historically
deemphasized, and even lost, by the Ninth Circuit, and which warrants facilitation,
if not restoration. However, that phenomenon may have dwindling importance,
and could be irrelevant, in an era of rapidly escalating internationalization and
computerization. The promotion of regionalism correspondingly conflicts, or at
least is in tension, with the conscientious discharge of the significant circuit
federalizing responsibility: the duty to reconcile the federal Constitution and
101
federal legislation as well as state and local policies.
Furthermore, the
commission members asserted that having one appellate court construe and apply
federal law in the western United States is a strength of the Ninth Circuit which
102
should be preserved and fostered,
but the divisional concept could increase
disuniformity across the region because the concept would effectively create three
appeals courts and because the precedent that any of the divisions articulates
would have no binding effect on the others.
The commissioners bolstered their suggestions by explaining how the
recommendations are preferable to the alternative system preferred by Chief Judge
103
Hug in response to the commission tentative draft report.
The Chief Judge
concurred with the commission proposal calling for the establishment of three
divisions but suggested that the entities be comprised exclusively of resident

judges and that they have no discrete adjudicative role. 164 The commissioners

characterized this recommendation as antithetical to their own approach, the
essence of which is a regionally-premised adjudicative unit that is small, stable
99.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48; see also Caplan, s11pra note
45, at 965-71 (analyzing numerous benefits that a large circuit affords); Wallace, supra
note 42, at 944 (analyzing diversity that a large circuit affords).
100.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48-49. The court has instituted
efforts that respond to the concerns regarding regionalism. See infra note 140 and
accompanying text
101.
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed.
1994); John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980).
For analyses of similar ideas, see Caplan, supra note 45, at 960-65 and Spreng, supra note
10, at 945-47.
102.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 49-50; see also Hug, supra note
42, at 300 (expressing similar sentiments).
103.
See HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75; see also COMMISSION REPoRT, supra
note 1, at 51-52 (analyzing Chief Judge Hug's proposal).
104.
See HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75.
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and autonomous enough to operate effectively as an appellate decisional body and
which has responsibility for the law applicable within the region. The commissioners
criticized the proposal developed by Chief Judge Hug because attorneys and
members of the divisions would have to monitor panel opinions throughout the
105
circuit, even though the commission arrangement could well have this impact.
The commissioners also claimed that the Chief Judge's suggestion regarding panel
constitution would overvalue regionalism by requiring all panels to have n
majority of their membership drawn from the particular appellate region and
would underemphasize regional connection by having a regionally composed
106
panel determination subject to circuit-wide rehearing en banc.
Chief Judge
Rug's recommendation, therefore, purportedly would advance neither the
regionalizing nor the federalizing responsibilities deemed important by the
107
commission members, which their formulation expressly sought to harmonize.
In the final analysis, the commissioners' identification of the
complications ostensibly plaguing the Ninth Circuit was insufficiently convincing
to sustain the type of far-reaching and potentially disruptive solutions prescribed.
The futures of this court and of the appellate system are too crucial to warrant
significant change without clear, persuasive substantiation. When the legislative
and judicial branches make critical decisions about the circuits, Congress and the
courts should not permit generalized perceptions, the commissioners' unelaborated
experiences and the unsupported opinions of self-interested individuals to replace
empirical data, which independent, expert evaluators systematically collect,
scrutinize and synthesize. 108
F. Reasons for Problems with the Commission Report

A number of phenomena frustrate attempts to pinpoint exactly why the
endeavors of the commissioners ultimately proved to be inadequate. One essential
obstacle is that much of the activity undertaken by the commissioners proceeded
in private. For example, many commission meetings were not open to the public,
and communications involving the commissioners and the commission staff were
private. In fairness, the important, controversial and sensitive character of the tasks
performed and the need to promote frank interchange among the commissioners
and between them and their expert advisors might have required secrecy. The
105.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis in original); see also
supra note 93 and accompanying text (suggesting that the commission arrangement could
have this impact).
106.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 52 (emphasis in original).
107.
See id.; see also supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (analyzing the
two duties).
108.
See, e.g., HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75; Stephen B. Burbank, The
Transformation ofAmerican Civil Procedure: The Example ofRule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1925, 1927-29 (1989); see also Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and impact of Rule
11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943 (1992) (compiling, and suggesting the importance of, empirical
data); infra notes 114-32 and accompanying text (affording a number of suggestions for
additional study).
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commission did implement certain useful actions, such as the establishment of a
website, to help inform the public while the entity accumulated some instructive
material on the operations of the federal appellate courts.
Despite these circumstances, one can delineate several reasons for the
insufficiency of the report and proposals submitted by the commissioners. Most
significantly, Congress allotted the commission remarkably little time to finish an
enormous project For instance, the commissioners had a shorter period to
complete their study than numerous appellate courts consume in deciding appeals.
The time limitation could have seriously hampered commission efforts to
assemble, assess and synthesize substantial amounts of relevant empirical
information. Moreover, lawmakers apparently assigned the entity an unclear
statutory mandate and authorized an inadequate number of commissioners to
complete all of the work necessary. For example, Judge Gilbert Merritt and Judge
Pamela Rymer continued to fulfill their ongoing, substantial obligations as
members of the appellate court bench throughout the year when they discharged
the onerous responsibilities imposed as active participants on the commission. The

brief time span prescribed and the relatively few commissioners provided may
have precluded the entity's deployment of subcommittees, which forerunners of
the commission, such as the Federal Courts Study Committee and the Hruska
Commission, seemed to use rather effectively. The comm1ss1oners
correspondingly could have conceptualized the project somewhat differently and
could have accomplished considerably more with the generous financial resources
appropriated by senators and representatives. For instance, legal scholars might
have conducted empirical analyses by extensively interviewing appeals court
judges for ideas on consistency, district court judges for perspectives on coherence
and appellate attorneys for opinions on the decreased procedural opportunities that
the circuits currently afford. The academicians might also have attempted to evaluate
specific cases, from the time when counsel and parties filed the appeals until they
received disposition, to determine whether appellate courts resolved the cases
uniformly, coherently, expeditiously, inexpensively and fairly. Nevertheless,
temporal restraints probably restricted many of the activities suggested.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit and other courts may simply not be
experiencing difficulties that are problematic enough to require remediation with
solutions as potentially drastic as the divisional organization proffered by the
commissioners. Indeed, the commissioners forthrightly acknowledged that they
found Ninth Circuit administration to equal operations in the remaining appellate
courts, all of which now function efficaciously. However, the commission
members apparently considered Ninth Circuit case law to be insufficiently
consistent and coherent, certainty and predictability to be inadequate, federalization
and regionalism to be unsatisfactory and judges not to be collegial enough.
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ID. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Introduction

The legislative and judicial branches might pursue several courses of
action. Lawmakers and judges have closely assessed, and must continue to
scrutinize, the commission report and recommendations. 109 Legislators, individual
appeals courts, most notably the Ninth Circuit, and the appellate system should
implement any measures that will (1) facilitate unifonn, coherent, prompt,
economical and equitable case disposition, (2) foster certainty and predictability, (3)
promote collegiality, and (4) suitably rationalize federalization and regionalism
while comporting with efficacious circuit administration. Numerous members of
Congress may believe that they must accede to the independent, expert entity
which lawmakers authorized, because the commissioners and the expert
commission staff spent twelve months analyzing the complications encountered by
the appeals courts and fashioning remedies for the difficulties they detected.
Nonetheless, the dearth of convincing empirical data that underlies the commission
findings and proposals as well as the dramatic, controversial nature of the approach
developed suggest that acquiescence is not warranted.
Senators and representatives must ascertain more conclusively whether the
circuits do or will experience problems sufficiently troubling to deserve treatment.
If lawmakers so determine, they should identify those complications precisely,
survey the broadest practicable range of salutary solutions for present and
anticipated difficulties, and tailor remedies to the problems delineated in particular
courts and across the appellate system. Legislators must exercise caution because
the future of the circuits is at issue. For example, insofar as Congress is unsure
about the complications that courts currently or will face, or about the
effectiveness of the recommendations proposed by the commission or others,
Congress might want to defer action, evaluate the prospect of more sttidy or
approve circuit experimentation with promising refonns. To the extent that
lawmakers have lingering concerns, they must reject extreme or irrevocable
solutions, including certain structural and systemic remedies, and preserve
flexibility to prescribe diverse approaches.
Legislators should also consult the Judicial Conference of the United
States, which serves as the policymaking arm for all of the federal courts, the
Circuit Judicial Councils, which are the governing bodies in the twelve regional

109.
I emphasize Congress because the legislative branch must authorize most
actions. However, courts can institute some actions without legislative authorization, and
Congress should consult judges. See infra notes 110-11, 143 and accompanying text. The
Senate and House held hearings on the commission's report in 1999. See infra note 113.
However, neither body took additional fonnal action on the bill embodying the commission
proposals during the 106th Congress and, thus, each must continue its study. See supra note
3.
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circuits and in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, llD as
well as individual appellate and district court judges. The institutions and jurists
have substantial, relevant expertise respecting the day-to-day operations of the
federal judicial system, while Third Branch cooperation will be instrumental to the
effective implementation of those specific measures that senators and
representatives may choose to authorize. For instance, Chief Judge Hug's
comprehensive comments on the proposals, inserted by the commission in the
October tentative draft report, sharpened important issues for legislative
examination. The commissioners also expressly admonished Congress to seek
guidance from Ninth Circuit judges when finalizing the details of any divisional
arrangement which lawmakers might adopt 111
The commission seemingly detennined that the Ninth Circuit now

encounters certain difficulties, which principally implicate circuit law's
consistency, coherence, certainty and predictability as well as judicial collegiality,
regionalism and appellate justice. The commissioners apparently considered the
particular complications that they delineated so problematic as to require
application of the divisional concept However, the evidence that the commission
adduced did not definitively show that the circumstances in the Ninth Circuit are
dire enough to warrant effectuation of the divisional scheme or that the
recommendation's implementation would significantly improve operations in the
Circuit
These propositions indicate that legislators should evaluate several means
of proceeding. The United States Senate and House of Representatives, through
the respective Judiciary Committees, have assessed, and could continue to
analyze, the commission's report and suggestions to ascertain whether the findings
and proposals proffered can support legislative action. Both chambers have
sought, and might in the future solicit, additional public input, especially from
federal appeals and district court judges and appellate lawyers, on the
commissioners' endeavors. However, the views expressed to date have resembled
the ideas solicited by the commission with surveys and are vulnerable to similar
criticisms, namely that the perspectives constitute the opinions of people who may
be self-interested and only reflect their individual experiences.1 12 The Judiciary
Committees in the Senate and the House could undertake independent
investigations of the questions that were crucial to the commissioners' recentlycompleted assessment Moreover, Congress bas employed, and might continue to
use, the proposed legislation incorporating the recommended commission statute,
110.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 331-32 (1994); see generally John W. Oliver,
Reflections on the History of Circuit Judicial Councils and Circuit Judicial Conferences, 64
F.R.D. 201 (1974) (discussing the history of the Circuit Judicial Councils); Jack B.
Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemala'ng Procedures, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 905
(1976) (discussing the rulemaking power of the federal courts).
111.
See HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75. But see COMMISSION REroR.T,

supra
note 1, at 51-52; supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text. For the commissioners'
admonition, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
112.
See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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which Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) and Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
introduced during January 1999, 113 to explore applicable issues, reconsider the
factual detenninations made by the commissioners and refine the commission
suggestions.
Nevertheless, attempts to discern whether the commissioners correctly
found that the Ninth Circuit situation is sufficiently troubling to deserve
remediation and, if so, whether the commission solutions will prove efficacious,
will be inconclusive without further evaluation. Those circumstances exist
primarily because the commissioners depended substantially on the members'
personal experiences and on the opinions of appellate and district court judges as
well as appellate attorneys in identifying putative difficulties, rather than
systematically gathering, analyzing and synthesizing the maximum possible
quantity of applicable empirical data. The clarification, if not the definitive
resolution, of some unclear issues integral to the commission findings and
proposals must await the collection, scrutiny and synthesis of more empirical
material and comparatively exacting measurements. Illustrative factors are
whether Ninth Circuit case precedent is disunifonn or incoherent, whether the
court's appellate judges are uncollegial or whether the circuit fulfills its en bane
responsibilities ineffectively and, if so, whether any deficiencies detected correlate
with the court's substantial magnitude.1'4 A related, important question, namely
the efficacy of the divisional construct proffered, cannot be conclusively answered
until the federal judiciary has actually applied, and evaluators have closely
analyzed, that unprecedented approach.
Several of these and other significant matters appear to resist very precise
definition or calculation, to implicate subjective or political judgments, or to
involve choices among multiple, often competing, values. However,
systematically-assembled empirical data could infonn understanding of quite a
few issues. For example, the meaning of collegiality and the concept's
measurement remain relatively elusive, despite the assiduous efforts of numerous

113.
See supra note I. Each house held July 1999 hearings that elicited few new
ideas but took no other formal action in the 106th Congress. OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON THE
FINAL REPORT OF TifE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF
APPEALS BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OVERSIGHT & THE COURTS
(1999); OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS BEFORE THE HOUSE JUDICIARY SUBCOMM.
ON COURTS & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1999). Circuit-splitting bills were offered in March
2000 and February and March 2001. See supra note 3.
114.
Illustrative is Professor Hellman's careful work on consistency and related
issues. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large
Circuit, in R.EsTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THB
FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (hereinafter
Hellman, REsTRUCTURING JUSTICE]; Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Arthur D.
Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice ofPrecedent in the Large
Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989).
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circuit judges to illuminate the notion. 115 Consistency and coherence, which by
definition must be calibrated over time, are somewhat unclear. The ideas can be
rather subjective and require careful assessment through, for instance, the
meticulous comparison of appeals' factual and legal premises. 116 Certainty and
predictability seem relatively ephemeral, defy exact calculation and entail an
element of subjectivity.
Ascertaining the accuracy of commission contentions that both the
smaller decisionmaking units and the divisions recommended by the
commissioners will foster collegiality, uniform and coherent circuit Jaw, certainty
and predictability as well as properly rationalize federalization and regionalism is
even more complicated. For example, this exercise would necessitate multi-factor,
and somewhat subjective, evaluation of many rather esoteric concepts while
demanding speculation, and perhaps political determinations, 117 about the
effectiveness of an essentially untested mechanism.
Federalization and regionalism, notions that substantiate the commission
divisional arrangement, 118 concomitantly illustrate the potential need to select
among numerous, frequently competing values. For instance, when the important
circuit responsibility for harmonizing federal law and local policies conflicts with
the idea (of arguably declining salience) implicating linkages between a discrete
geographical area and the appeals court forum, regionalism should yield. The
concept of appellate justice-the expeditious, inexpensive and fair disposition of
cases 119-provides a similar example. Since approximately 1970, expanding
circuit dockets have apparently compromised the notion of appellate justice and
the analogous notion of the appellate ideal: the aspiration that courts resolve each
appeal on the merits 'vith thorough briefing and full oral presentation; close
consultation, including the circulation of draft opinions, among the three circuit
115.
See, e.g., COFFIN, supra note 54, at 215; Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and
Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-64 (1998); O'Scannlain,
supra note 9, at 315; Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST.
L.J. 585 (1995).
116.
Professor Hellman explores these ideas. See sources cited supra note 114;
see also JUDITH A. MCKENNA, STRUC1URAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF .APPEALS 93-95 (Federal Judicial Center 1993) (analyzing these ideas and
Professor Hellman's work).
117.
See EDWARDS ET AL., CoMMENTS, supra note 25 (suggesting that the
divisional approach is political); supra note 89 and accompanying text (suggesting that the
divisional approach is the consummate political compromise, although the commission
expressly disavowed the applicability of politics to the debate over the future of the
appellate system).
118.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 36, 49-50; see also supra notes
99-102 and accompanying text (analyzing federalization and regionalism).
119.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. For analyses of prompt, economical and fair
resolution, see Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Le\•el of Rule: The
Example ofFederal Rule of Civil Procedure I, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325 (1995); Carl Tobias,
The New Certiorari and a National Study ofthe Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1264,
1286 n.90 (1996).
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judges who hear the case; and the issuance of a written decision which
comprehensively explains the reasons for the conclusion reached and which is
printed in the official Federal Reporter series. 12 For instance, appellate courts
currently accord the complete panoply of procedures, particularly oral arguments
and written determinations that are published in the Federal Reporter, to a
markedly smaller percentage of appeals, even as the median time required by the
circuits for terminating all of the cases filed has remained comparatively
constant. 121 The substantial interests that specific parties have in equitable
appellate disposition and thorough judicial consideration, therefore, can clash, or
at least be in tension, with prompt and economical dispute resolution. However,
the appeals courts seem to treat fairly most cases that receive relatively limited
examination from judges. 122

°

These propositions suggest that Congress should provide for the
systematic collection, analysis and synthesis of enough empirical information to
ascertain with confidence whether the situations of individual courts, especially
the Ninth Circuit, are sufficiently severe to justify remediation and, if so, whether
those solutions designated would work. Legislators must not make important
decisions about the future of the appeals courts, absent the greatest, feasible
amount of applicable empirical material respecting the difficulties experienced by

circuits and the most efficacious responses, much less prescribe unproven
approaches that could detrimentally affect the delivery of appellate justice.
Illustrative of inadvisable action lacking empirical support would be passage of
the bill that would split the Ninth Circuit, introduced by senators in March 2000,
which Congress did not adopt and which senators and representatives reintroduced
in February and March 2001 and may seriously consider.
B. Additional Study

The earlier critique of the commission report and proposals found that the
commissioners did not definitely demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit, or any other
appeals court, presently encounters complications problematic enough to require
treatment, particularly with measures that appear as impractical and disruptive as
120.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 70; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE,
supra note 6, at 21-27; see also MCKENNA, supra note 116, at 32-35 (providing the median

time for resolution).
121.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-23, 70; see also FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMM. REP., supra note 23, at 109-10 (analyzing changes in the procedures
afforded); MCKENNA, supra note 116, at 32-35 (same and providing the median time for
resolution).
122.
Many of these cases are pursued by pro se litigants or are accurately
characterized as routine. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-23 (analyzing
measures that courts used to treat the docket increases); Tobias, supra note 119, at 127374; see also David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV.
72, 82-84 (1983) (analyzing routine cases). But see William M. Richman & William L.
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand
Tradition, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 273, 275-76 (1996).
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the commission's recommendations. However, this is not a criticism of the
commissioners who labored conscientiously to conclude a gigantic assignment and
who probably accomplished all that is reasonable to ex"Pect in the incredibly short time
afforded for the study. Lawmakers may never be able to secure perfect infonnation on
the appellate system, however they should be cautious about premising significant
modifications in institutions as crucial as the federal intennediate appeals courts
on the commission report or on the incomplete knowledge currently available.
Congress has several vehicles available for initiating additional study. First,
senators and representatives can reauthorize the commission and, thus, effectively
extend the entity's life, even though numerous lawmakers may be understandably
reluctant to ask commissioners, who have already devoted a year to examining the
circuits, to commit even greater time. Second, legislators can instruct an existing
institution, namely the Federal Judicial Center or the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to continue the endeavor commenced by the commission. Both
research arms of the federal courts certainly possess much relevant material and
expertise, a phenomenon manifested by the assistance the personnel in the Judicial
Center and Administrative Office rendered the commissioners. However, the
research bodies may lack sufficient detachment from the Third Branch. Congress
can also sponsor more searching inquiry, for example, under the aegis of the
respective Judiciary Committees, but those panels might not have the requisite
staff, funding and experience. Lawmakers can correspondingly approve a new
expert entity, which would be independent, and provide this institution enough
fiscal support and temporal flexibility to finish the important project by building on
the prior efforts, especially the recent commission work, and by training fresh
perspectives on the inquiry. The last approach is preferable because the requisite
staff, funding, expertise, and new viewpoints would be available.
The assessors must possess considerable independence and expertise, and
Congress must appropriate resources, particularly time, which will facilitate the
study's efficient completion. The evaluators should gather, analyze and synthesize
the maximum possible empirical data on the difficulties that the appeals courts
confront and then ascertain whether the complications are sufficiently troubling to
warrant remediation and, if so, develop the widest spectrum of potential solutions.
For instance, assessors might attempt to determine conclusively, or at least with
increased assurance, whether Ninth Circuit case precedent is disuniform or
incoherent, whether the court creates uncertainty or unpredictability or whether the
circuit's judges are uncollegial. Were the answer to any of these questions
positive, the evaluators must examine whether the problems discerned derive from
the court's size and, if so, whether the divisional structure prescribed would be
responsive.
Assessors should also institute efforts to improve comprehension of
federalization, regionalism, appellate justice and the appellate ideal. For example,
given the apparently decreasing importance of regionalism in a nation
experiencing accelerated globalization and computerization, does regionalism
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deserve promotion and, if so, can its inherent tensions with federalization be
123
reconciled?
Are appellate justice's constituents-the expeditious, economical
and equitable disposition of appeals-similarly incompatible or can they be
harmonized? 124 Is there a realistic expectation of reattaining the appellate ideal
when the growth in the number of appeals taken by attorneys and parties continues
to outstrip the resources the justice system has available for thoroughly reviewing
every district court determination? 125
Those conducting the analysis must first assemble, scrutinize and
synthesize all of the applicable material previously collected by evaluators, a
project that should start with the information accumulated by the commission. The
Ninth Circuit Executive Office, the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts are obvious sources of relevant material
regarding the Ninth Circuit. Assessors should also capitalize on the insightful
research related to the consistency of Ninth Circuit case law that Professor Arthur
Hellman has conducted by updating his work on uniformi~ in this appellate court

and by extending the approach to the remaining circuits. 126

Evaluators might comprehensively solicit the views of federal appeals
and trial court judges, as well as appellate lawyers, on matters such as consistency,
coherence, certainty, predictability, collegiality, federalization, regionalism and
appellate justice. For example, assessors may want to interview circuit judges for
opinions about collegiality, district judges for ideas on certainty and predictability,
and appellate counsel for perspectives on the speed, cost and fairness of appellate
resolution. Moreover, all of these individuals should be interviewed for their views
on the uniformity and coherence of circuit law, federalization and regionalism.
Evaluators can also probe the core commission thesis that smaller decisional units,
especially divisions, foster practically all of the above-listed attributes in several
ways. First, assessors might compare bench and bar perceptions in appeals courts
consisting of many or few members and scrutinize recent First Circuit operation and
rather cursory Fifth and Ninth Circuit application of structural regimes that
resemble divisions during the late 1970s. 127
However, there are certain reasons why evaluators should pursue
additional avenues. The opinions of some federal courts observers, including
judges and appellate practitioners, can be intrinsically limited by the self-interest
and experiences of those individuals, while the Fifth and Ninth Circuit
123.
See supra notes 99-102, 118 and accompanying text.
124.
See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text. It would also be helpful to
enhance appreciation of certainty and predictability, but their esoteric nature complicates
this effort.
125.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
126.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text. They might similarly use recent
work on the en bane process. See generally Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and
Determinants ofthe Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999).
127.
See Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29 (1990); supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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experimentation may not be extensive or apposite enough to serve as an accurate
indicator of smaller appeals courts' comparative efficacy, much less to function as
a trustworthy predictor of how the divisional arrangement would actually work. 128
Assessors, accordingly, might monitor particular cases from the time when
attorneys and litigants institute them until circuits tenninate the appeals, a form of
inquiiy that can elucidate whether decisional entities with fewer judges are
preferable and whether appellate court disposition is consistent, coherent, prompt,
inexpensive and equitable. For example, evaluators can attempt to pinpoint the
relevance, if any, of Ninth Circuit magnitude or the reasons why that court's
resolution seems relatively fast in terms of certain parameters but rather
inexpeditious vis-a-vis other criteria. More specifically, why does the Ninth
Circuit most promptly resolve appeals after submission at oral argument, while
being the third slowest court to reach final resolution after the notice of appeal's
filing? Can assessors identify, and the court properly address, the phenomena
129
which are responsible for less prompt decisionmaking?
The effort to track
individual cases from filing through disposition might also illuminate whether
Ninth Circuit reliance on the limited en bane mechanism to perform the court's en
bane responsibilities is satisfactoiy. For instance, evaluators can analyze the
limited en bane technique by ascertaining whether the Ninth Circuit reconsiders a
substantially smaller percentage of appeals than other appellate courts. If so, they
can determine whether rehearing's infrequency correlates with a comparatively
high incidence of erroneous panel decisionmaking or with a relatively significant
rate of disunifonni~ inside the Ninth Circuit or between this appeals court and the
10
remaining circuits.
Finally, should the assessors definitively conclude that the current
circumstances of any appellate court deserve attention, the evaluators ought to
explore the broadest feasible array of applicable solutions. Valuable sources for
constructive approaches include the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals, its predecessors-namely the Long Range Planning
Committee of the United States Judicial Conference, the Federal Courts Study
Committee and the Hruska Commission-as well as federal appellate courts
scholars, all of whom have thoroughly canvassed an enormous number of rather
conventional measures and numerous comparatively innovative possibilities. 131
Assessors might also consult relevant experiences of the appeals courts, most
prominently the Ninth Circuit, which have permanently effectuated, or have
128.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text (analyzing the limitations); see
also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 50 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit measure is
inapposite); supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text (suggesting the difficulties entailed
in performing the analysis that I propose).
129.
See supra note 34.
130.
For a helpful example of this type of work, see George, supra note 126.
131.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-25, 59-74; FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM. REP., supra note 23, at 109-23; HRUSKA COMM'N, supra note 35, at 234-43;
LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 67-70, 131-33; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra
note 6, at 106-286.
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experimented for many years with, a plethora of salutary mechanisms. These
devices include various alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR) and somewhat
refined appellate docket management techniques, like screening panels comprised
of three judges who normally terminate approximately 160 cases each month
through the invocation of abbreviated procedures. 132
In short, evaluators must undertake efforts to clarify the important,
unclear dimensions of the report and recommendations that the Commission 011
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals recently published.
Assessors should also ascertain more conclusively whether the conditions of specific
appellate courts, especially the Ninth Circuit, necessitate remediation and, if so,
designate the finest solutions for the individual appeals courts and for the entire
system.
The above-stated propositions, especially regarding courts' circumstance
and measures for improvement, mean that authorizing additional study would now

be the best course of action. The commissioners produced insufficient persuasive
evidence to indicate that the situation of the Ninth Circuit is serious enough to
justify treatment such as implementing the essentially untested and potentially
ineffective divisional organization. The federal intermediate appellate courts are too
crucial to warrant major alteration without a more compelling demonstration of
severe problems. Nonetheless, members of Congress may reject further study and
institute reform. Quite a few lawmakers might find appropriate deference to, or be
concerned about second-guessing, the entity, which they commissioned and which
expended one year evaluating the circuits and compiling a report and proposals.
Other senators and representatives may believe that now is the time to act because
the situation is so grave, because the appellate system has received adequate
analysis, or because there is enough information to at least proceed cautiously.
C. Experimentation

Congress might pass the suggested statute devised by the commissioners
exactly as the commission crafted the recommended legislation, or Congress may
modify this iteration. However, the commissioners did not definitively show that
any appeals court, including the Ninth Circuit, experiences difficulties sufficiently
troubling to require attention. Even had the commission better substantiated the
need for change, the commissioners failed to demonstrate how the responses
which they proposed would be efficacious.
Lawmakers must accord all of the appellate courts much flexibility to
experiment with a myriad of solutions for the specific complications that the
132.
See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 31; J, S. CECIL,
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
INNOVATIONS PROJECT 55-70 (Federal Judicial Center 1985) (discussing innovations in the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals); Hellman, RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 114; Hug,
supra note 42, at 301-02; Wallace, supra note 42, at 944; see generally EVALUATION COMM.
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 98; infra note 163 and accompanying text (analyzing ADR).
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circuits confront If appeals courts can tailor remedies to their particular
circumstances, the arrangement should foster development of the most effective
alternatives. Legislators and judges ought to remember that no single course of
action will prove equally felicitous in every circuit, while appellate courts could
well discover that superior approaches exist only after experiencing a number of
false starts and completing considerable testing.
Senators and representatives, therefore, must eschew the recommended
statute written by the commission in the measure's precise formulation but might
recalibrate the proposed legislation pursuant to the earlier criticisms. Congress
should essentially prescribe measures that will enable the appeals courts to resolve
cases as consistently, coherently, promptly, economically and equitably as the
circuits can and that will have little detrimental impact on appellate court
operations. Lawmakers could specifically implement these ideas by authorizing
circumscribed Ninth Circuit experimentation with efficacious mechanisms that
address continued caseload growth and the more pressing problems identified by
the commissioners and that would incorporate the most desirable facets of the
commission suggestions. Legislators, accordingly, may want to integrate several
beneficial aspects of the commission prescriptions with certain helpful
recommendations in Chief Judge Rug's cogent response to the tentative draft
report and with numerous constructive suggestions developed by the Evaluation
Committee he appointed in early 1999.
Congress should expressly reject the commissioners' proffered divisional
en bane concept while retaining circuit-wide stare decisis and substituting some
form of circuit-wide review, which is premised on the criteria governing en bane
reconsideration in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, for the Circuit Division.
The pertinent portions of the Rule state that "rehearing is not favored and
ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en-bane consideration is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding
133
involves a question of exceptional importance." The changes I suggest would
promote consistent and coherent circuit law and perhaps foster certainty and
predictability, in part by replacing requirements, such as the relatively imprecise
commission articulation of "conflict," which would invoke Circuit Division
jurisdiction, with the Rule 35 standards, which have acquired rather clear meaning
or which at least can be particularized by consulting individual appeals courts'
134
application of that procedural stricture.
Senators and representatives might correspondingly empower the Ninth
Circuit to reform the limited en bane device, a technique that appellate court has
133.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see also HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75
(suggesting a similar approach); see generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The
Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008 (1991); Michael Soliminc,
Ideology and En Banc Review, 61 N.C. L. REV. 29 (1988).
134.
See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text. The changes would also
avoid the commission articulation's detrimental effects, such as satellite litigation and
unnecessary expense and delay.
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applied for twenty years but which none of the remaining appeals courts has
deployed. The Ninth Circuit could increase somewhat the comparatively few cases
currently reheard en bane and enlarge the eleven-judge limited en bane tribunal to
thirteen decisionmakers, consisting of four members stationed in each division
135
contemplated by the commissioners and the Ninth Circuit chief judge. These
modifications, the first of which the court has adopted, would treat criticisms that
the Ninth Circuit maintains insufficient uniformity and coherence because
reconsideration's infrequency clarifies too few panel determinations and because
the present limited en bane court's size allows six members, who may not be
representative of the entire circuit, to speak for twenty-eightjudges. 136
Lawmakers as well might authorize Ninth Circuit experimentation with
adjudicatory divisions, the keystone of the divisional structure, which the appellate
court could model principally on the recommendation developed by the
commissioners. The Ninth Circuit might constitute three-judge panels in the
manner championed by Chief Judge Hug, although the method proposed by the
commissioners might prove weferable because it may harmonize better
regionalism and federalization. 37 Under the scheme I am suggesting, appeals
court judges in the divisions envisioned by the commissioners could assume
special responsibility for cultivating intracircuit consistency. More specifically, the
jurists might circulate to each divisional member draft copies of all opinions, thus
permitting every colleague to raise potential conflicts before the divisions release
final determinations; this practice would closely resemble the approach that many
of the appellate courts currently follow and that some of these tribunals have
instituted during the last decade. 138 Judges could also be particularly sensitive to
the possible creation of disuniformity and exercise substantial restraint by, for
instance, evincing considerable respect for the decisions which the other two
divisions issue.
135.
See S. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing both the notion that fewer than a
majority of the active circuit judges might activate the process and the en bane court's
enlargement); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 52 n.111 (suggesting that fewer than a
majority of the active circuit judges might activate the process); HUG COMMENTS, supra
note 75 (proposing the en bane court's enlargement); supra note 98 (stating that the court
has endorsed both ideas) JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 25 (same),
136.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also EVALUATION COMM.
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 98, at 2-6 (stating that the Committee has proposed, and the
court has adopted, the first idea and several others for improving the limited en bane
process); HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit is amenable to
change). Most of the changes that I propose would also promote federalization.
137.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 51-52; see also supra notes 10307 and accompanying text (analyzing the commission criticisms of Chief Judge Hug's
proposal).
138.
See HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75; JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note
25; see also EVALUATION COMM. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 98, at 6-10 (stating that the
Committee has suggested and the court has adopted several other ideas for maintaining
consistency); MCKENNA, supra note 116, at 97-98 (analyzing the circuits' implementation
of this practice).
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The Ninth Circuit should continue employing a number of measures, such as

bankruptcy appellate panels and sophisticated appeals management processes,
which have enabled it to manage the biggest docket effectively and to serve as an
experimental laboratory for larger tribunals. The Ninth Circuit might also test
certain concepts, including two-judge and district court appellate panels (DCAP),
139
apart from the divisional organization recommended by the commission. The
Evaluation Committee should correspondingly continue to study the Ninth Circuit
and to fonnulate efficacious proposals for improvement Concepts proffered by
the committee but not mentioned above include techniques for enhancing
regionalism, communications and collegiality, such as regional assignments that
require one judge from the administrative unit out of which the appeal arises to bear
the case. Another consists of devices for increasing productivity and expediting
review, namely greater "batching" of cases that involve similar issues or
140
statutes.
The ideas recommended would promote unifonnity and coherence,
would foster certainty and predictability and would appear to rationalize
federalization and regionalism appropriately.
The experimentation should proceed for a sufficient period, perhaps for
the commissioners' suggested eight-year-time frame, 141 and should appear in
enough diverse contexts to ascertain as conclusively as is practicable the
effectiveness of the techniques tested by appeals courts. An independent, expert
entity, such as the RAND Corporation, which recently completed a thorough
examination of procedures intended by Congress to decrease cost and delay and
which all ninety-four federal district courts applied pursuant to the Civil Justice
142
Refonn Act of 1990, must rigorously scrutinize the experimentation undertaken
by appellate courts. As previously stated, assessors should systematically
assemble, analyze and synthesize the maximum quantity of dependable empirical
infonnation. The evaluators should also consult the recommendations regarding
further study that were posited in the above subsection. Illustrative is the need to
determine (1) whether the divisional arrangement actually promotes consistent and
139.
See COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 1, at 62-66 (analyzing the DCAPs and
two-judge panels); Gordon Bennant & Judy Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth
Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 181 (1989); supra note 130 and accompanying text
(suggesting that the circuit explore ways to expedite resolution); supra note 132 and
accompanying text (analyzing the Ninth Circuit measures); cf. infra note 143 (proposing
that other circuits test these and additional measures); infra notes 164-65 and
accompanying text (criticizing these panels).
140.
See EVALUATION CoMMl1TEE INTERIM REPORT, s11pra note 98, at 12-17.
Senate Bill 1403 would have required regional assignments.
141.
See COMMISSION REPORT, s11pra note 1, at 95; b11t sees. 253, § 2E, 106th
Cong. (1999).
See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIV. JUSTICE, AN EVALUATIO~~
142.
OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND
COMPARISON DISTRICTS (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIV. JUSTICE,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON COURTS
(1996); see also COMMISSION REPORT, s11pra note 1, at 42-43 (proposing that the FJC
conduct the study).
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coherent circuit law as well as certainty and predictability; (2) whether the approach
facilitates prompt, economical and equitable disposition; and (3) whether it fosters
collegiality and rationalizes federalization and regionalism in an acceptable fashion.
Once the testing prescribed bas transpired and bas received comprehensive
assessment, senators and representatives should be able to delineate with
somewhat greater precision any difficulties which deserve long-term treatment and
should be able to designate the best solutions. Lawmakers can then enact
legislation to effectuate any permanent changes which are clearly indicated. 143
D. Additional Suggestions

Congress might carefully consider the implementation of numerous
actions in addition to, or complementary to, the framework for previously
proffered experimentation. Each appellate court has apparently faced, and could
confront, burgeoning appeals with inadequate resources to decide all of the cases as

unifonnly, coherently, expeditiously, inexpensively and fairly as is ideal. Every circuit
may also have encountered, and might well experience, other difficultiesincluding certain complications, such as inconsistency and incoherence seemingly
identified by the commissioners, which principally involve docket growth.
Lawmakers, therefore, have available two major options. Senators and
representatives can authorize approaches with the goal of reducing the volume of '
appeals that attorneys and litigants contemplate taking, and if that alternative proves
deficient, can empower the federal judiciary to apply mechanisms directly to
address the increasing number of cases that are actually filed in a uniform, coherent,
prompt, economical and equitable manner that minimally disrupts appellate court
administration.
A substantial percentage of the actions that solons can evaluate and may
institute would implicate the proposals regarding experimentation which were
examined previously in this subsection. However, none of the ideas explored
below is a panacea, or would apparently be superior, for reasons that are primarily
related to practicality and efficacy. Indeed, the comparatively lukewarm reception
which the legislative and judicial branches have accorded to most of the concepts,
since the time that federal intermediate appellate courts were dramatically altered
by docket growth, may attest to the relative infeasibility and ineffectiveness of the
measures.

The quintessential way to decrease escalating appeals would be
restriction of the federal district courts' present expansive criminal and civil
jurisdiction. Circuit Judge Merritt, whom Justice White joined, broached one feature
143.
I focus on the Ninth Circuit, but Congress might authorize, and encourage,
testing in other courts. For example, circuits, namely the Fifth and Eleventh with growing

dockets, could test DCAPs and two-judge panels, while the Federal Circuit might resolve
tax or social security appeals. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; infra note 152
and accompanying text. The controversial nature of the authority issue and the changes
suggest that Congress should expressly authorize them.
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fundamental to the civil constituent of this response in "additional views"
appended to the commission report. 144 The jurists encouraged senators and
representatives to circumscribe diversity of citizenship jurisdiction by preserving
such jurisdiction only when "parties can show a concrete need for a f ederol
forum ...because (1) of the existence oflocal influence that threatens piudice to an
out-of.state litigant, or (2) of the complex nature of interstate litigation."1 s However,
numerous perceptive observers of the federal appellate courts and of Congress are
not particularly sanguine about the prospects for success irt attempting to limit
criminal or civil jurisdiction as a general proposition or the diversity of citizenship

concept specifically. 146 For instance, throughout the 1990s, legisliltors seemed to
federalize less criminal behavior than in the preceding decade and to recognize
fewer new civil causes of action than during the 1960s and 1970s. 147 Lawmakers
also have cabined some civil jurisdiction, which involves most importantly cases
pursued by incarcerated irtdividuals. 148 Nonetheless, solons did pass the quite
comprehensive Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and a
large number of rather insignificant criminal statutes throughout the decade as
well as the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which authorized comparatively broad-ranging civil causes of action.' 4j
Moreover, it is helpful to understand that many members of Congress apparently
experience considerable difficulty resisting the essentially cost-free political
benefits, which can frequently accrue from federalizing additional areas of
criminal behavior and from creating civil causes of action.
Of course, the United States Supreme Court might confine the
thoroughgoing crimirtal and civil jurisdiction that federal district courts currently
possess, should lawmakers decide agairtst narrowing either component of the
federal justice process. Over the last several decades, the High Court has gradually
tightened abstention, the justiciability doctrirtes, including mootness and ripeness,
144.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 77-88.
145.
Id. at 80. For analyses of similar approaches, see LONG RANGE PLAN, supra
note 35, at 134; MCKENNA, supra note 116, at 141-53.
146.
See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 127, at 34-37; Martha Dragich, Once A
Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of tlze Federal Courts of Appeals, 1996 Wis. L.
REV. 11, 16-17; William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L.
REv. 719, 722-25 (1995).
147.
See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986); Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984); National
Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970); Occupational Safety
and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
148.
See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-32, 110 Stat 1214 (1996); Prison Litigation Refonn Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996): Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
149.
See Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat.
1392 (1996); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 102322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990).
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and analogous devices, even though relatively stringent application can preclude
merits-based resolution and can marginal~ reduce appellate filings, even were
stricter enforcement less problematic. 15 In short, legislative contraction of
jurisdiction is not a productive near-term or permanent solution, as Congress is
more likely to expand federal criminal and civil law, while judicially-imposed
restrictions are inadvisable because they may curtail federal court access too
sharply and may minimally limit the total number of appeals in any event.
Other approaches, which could decrease the surging cases that counsel

and clients think they might bring before the circuits, seem similarly impractical or
inefficacious. Illustrative is the possibility of making appellate court review
discretionary. The commissioners were unconvinced that express discretionary
jurisdiction for every appeal is wise. They found the notion "runs too counter to
the now prevalent" view, whereby a losing party should have one opportunity to
persuade an appellate court that the district judge has committed prejudicial error,
even though the commission explicitly acknowledged that the truncated appeals
court procedures which are scrutinized in this Article have "blurred the distinction
between obligatory and discretionary review." 151 Federal courts observers
correspondingly may believe that lawmakers can restrict swelling appellate
dockets through expansion of the jurisdiction exercised by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit since the appellate court's 1982 creation,
Indeed, the commissioners did explore the chief reasons that favor centralizing
appeals court review of social security and tax matters in the Federal Circuit but
designated no new categories of cases which solons might fruitfully assign to the
appellate court. A close examination of appeals' potential diversion from the twelve
regional circuits reveals that this prospect would effect no actual reduction in
filings, because the appellate judiciary as a whole would continue processing the
identical quantity of cases. 152

150.
See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function ofReview and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 544 (1969);
Dragich, supra note 146, at 16-17. Of course, judicial invalidation of statutes affords
another, albeit limited, way of narrowing jurisdiction. See United States v. Morrison, 529

U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The discussion in this and
the next sentence principally implicates civil jurisdiction.
151.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 70-72; see also 28 u.s.c. § 1291
(1994). For analyses of the relevant history, see BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6,
at 234-38; Dragich, supra note 146, at 52-54; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 23840; supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
152.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 72-74. Because the Federal
Circuit has little special expertise in the social security or tax areas, this approach may not
expedite appeals, yield systemic economies or be fairer to litigants. See JUSTICE DEPT.
COMMENTS, supra note 25; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 234; see also BAKER,
RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 222-27 (analyzing other ways to decrease appeals);
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 67-70 (analyzing bankruptcy appeals' treatment);
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 72 (describing the court as an innovative change);
Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 234-35 (analyzing other ways to decrease appeals).
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The apparent dearth of salutary remedies to restrict the upward spiral of

appeals means that the principal alternative remaining would be to treat directly
those docket increases that actually materialize in a uniform, coherent,
expeditious, inexpensive and fair fashion and that disturb efficacious appellate
court functioning as little as possible. One obvious, albeit rather controversial,
response would be the augmentation of circuit resources by supplementing extrajudicial support, by enhancing staff duties or by adding appeals court judgeships.
An inexorable rise in filings led the Judicial Conference of the United States to ask
that Congress approve ten more appellate members for the Ninth Circuit during 1993,
although the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council recently limited the request to five
judges.
Establishing additional appellate judgeships, expanding the number of
administrative personnel or expanding the responsibilities that appeals courts
assign to administrative personnel could facilitate the resolution of numerous
cases, but each approach might entail several, comparatively important
disadvantages. Enlarging non-judicial support or staff obligations could further
bureaucratize the appeals courts and concomitantly diminish appellate judges'
visibility and accountability. 153 The prospect of increasing the already significant
size of the federal bench: (1) has fueled the controversy over the Ninth Circuit's
bifurcation; (2) might be inefficient and accentuate a few difficulties, namely too
little collegiality, which the commissioners perceived; and (3) would provoke
vociferous opposition from many members of the Third Branch, even if the United
States Senate and the President could more felicitously confinn nominees for all of
the judicial positions that senators and representatives would authorize. 154
Legislative approval of substantially more new judgeships might also yield little
permanent improvement because the solution primarily serves as a braking
measure which can exacerbate certain detrimental features, such as inadequate
intracircuit consistency, insufficient manageability of the en bane procedure and
deficient collegiality, which federal courts observers have asserted may accompany
the administration of large appeals courts and which can ultimately raise the
controversial issue of circuit-splitting. 155

153.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
27-28 (1985) (discussing the growth of non-:judicial support, but coming to the opposite
conclusion); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF - INTEREsT: FEDERAL JUDGES ANO
COURT ADMINISTRATION 94-121 (1995). For analyses of these increases and their
disadvantages, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-25 and MCKENNA, supra note
116, at49-55.
154.
See Gordon Bennant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the
Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 319 (1994); Dragich, supra note 146,
at 45-49; Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of DMded Go,•emment, 41
EMORY L. J. 527 (1998) [hereinafter Tobias, Dividedj.
155.
See, e.g., BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 202; Tobias,
Impoverished, supra note 6, at 1388-89; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 235; see also
WILLIAM P. McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 107 (1984) (concluding that
increasing judgeships may not yield pennanent improvement); supra note 3.

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

672

[Vol. 43:3

A readily available option that would address multiplying appellate
caseloads, but would minimize some vexing problems mentioned above and that
could easily be implemented by the Senate and the Chief Executive, is to fill all of
the existing appeals and district court judicial vacancies, especially those seats on
the Ninth Circuit which have remained empty over a considerable period. For
much of the 1990s, the Ninth Circuit operated absent the complete complement of
twenty-eight active appellate court judges authorized by Congress, and for much
of the time since 1995, when the most recent circuit-division effort began,
156 Th.
.
ly one-quarter of tts
.
. d w1thout approximate
memb ershtp.
ts
functione
predicament forced the circuit to cancel 600 oral arguments in 1997, imposed
unnecessaty expense and delay on the appellate court, circuit judges, practitioners
and parties, and required the court to depend even more on decisionmakers other
than active appeals court members when staffing three-:judge panels. 157 Indeed, the
commissioners discovered that 43 percent of the panels, which the Ninth Circuit
constituted for cases that it terminated after oral argument during the 1997 fiscal
year, had at least one participant who was not an active member of the court. This
statistic compares rather unfavorably with the national average of thirty-three
percent. 158 The phenomenon of placing substantial reliance on visiting judges
might undermine consistency, coherence, collegiality, regionalism and appellate
justice. Assuming for the purposes of argument that mastery of circuit precedent
and collegiality promote uniform and coherent law as well as speedy, economical
and equitable resolution, jurists who are not active members of an ~peals court
are less likely to have this command of precedent and to be collegial. 1
0

0

Guaranteeing that the Ninth Circuit has available the entire contingent of
congressionally-authorized, active appellate judges to perform the burdensome
judicial duties assigned would, therefore, seemingly improve the court's present
circumstances. Affording the Ninth Circuit the total membership to which that
court is entitled could rectify or at least ameliorate quite a few difficulties, such as
too little uniformity, coherence, and collegiality, and might provide important
benefits, such as prompt, inexpensive and fair appellate disposition. In any event,
156.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 30; HUFSTEDLER COMMENTS,
supra note 64; Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR Ass'N COMMENTS, supra note 64; Carl Tobias,
The Judicial Vacancy Conundrom in the Ninth Circuit, 63 BROOK L. REV. 1283 (1997).
157.
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling The Federal Appellate Openings on the Ninth
Circuit, 19 REv. Lmo. 233 (2000) [hereinafter Tobias, Openings]; Viveca Novak, Empty·
Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puls Lives,
Justice on Hold, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A9; see also Bill Kisliuk, Judges'
Conference Clams Circuit-Splilling Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1
(analyzing the problems that the vacancies create).
158.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 31. For analyses of circuit reliance
on visiting judges, see BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 198-201, MCKENNA,
supra note 116, at 38-39, and Herald, supra note 12, at 466.
159.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 54, 157-58
and accompanying text (suggesting that panels without three active circuit judges further
decreases the prospect of securing the small, stable decisional units proposed by the
commission).
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it would be worthwhile to implement efforts to clarify whether some
complications, which the commission ostensibly found and which observers of the
court have purportedly discerned, result from inability to secure timely judicial
appointments for the Ninth Circuit's twenty-eight active positions.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, which bas historically exercised, and
now maintains, substantial responsibility for the judicial confinnation process,
might help fill the three, current vacancies on the Ninth Circuit by cooperating
with President George W. Bush as the panel did with President Bill Clinton during
1998, an endeavor that figured prominentlg;; in the appointment of sixty-five judges
0
for the appellate and district court bencb. 1 President Clinton seemingly consulted
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utab), the Judiciary Committee chair, and additional

committee members before announcing nominations while working closely with
Republican and Democratic senators and with political leaders from the states
having judicial openings to foster expeditious confirmation of the candidates
submitted. The Senate and President Bush could extend this approach by
attempting to facilitate the approval of judges for the 100 seats that are presently
vacant Nevertheless, relatively few current appellate openings are outside of the
Ninth Circuit, and judicial selection has proceeded rather slowly at the outset of a
new administration and of the 107th Congress, especially with a slight Democratic
majority in the Senate. Moreover, some inherent problems will naturally slow the
process.
Another straightforward, yet controversial, means of directly combatting
swollen dockets would be greater constriction of the shrinking procedural
opportunities that appellate courts accord counsel and litigants filing cases. 161 For
instance, the circuits might reduce even more the dwindling percentage of appeals
that receive thorough judicial consideration, particularly in the fonn of oral
arguments and written detenninations. This solution would lead to prompt and
economical resolution but could jeopardize equitable disposition and could further
erode judges' visibility and accountability as well as public acceptability of
appellate court decisionmaking. 162 Additional responses that frontally attack
expanding circuit caseloads appear equally infeasible or inefficacious, partly
because they might have several deleterious side effects. Illustrative are the various
63
alternatives to dispute resolution, namely arbitration and mediation, 1 and appeals
160.
See Carl Tobias, Leaving a Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 315 (1999). But cf. Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close of the Clinton
Administration, 52 RurGERS L. REY. 833 (2000) (finding that less cooperation led to 35
appointments in 1999); Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administration's End,
19 LAW & INEQ. J. 159 (2001) (finding that less cooperation led to 39 appointments in
2000). For analyses of judicial selection in the nation and in the Ninth Circuit, sec Bennant,
supra note 154, Tobias, Divided, supra note 154, and Tobias, Openings, supra note 157.
161.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text
162.
See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text For analyses of declining
visibility and accountability, see supra notes 151, 153 and accompanying text.
163.
See, e.g., JAMES B. EAGLIN, FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, THE PRE-ARGUMENT
CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN 1lIB SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN EVALUATIO~ (1990);
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court panels that do not consist of three circuit judges, such as district court
appellate, and two-judge, panels. 164 These devices could promote the rather
expeditious and inexpensive disposition of many cases, although some types of
ADR and panels without three appeals court members can similarly threaten fair
circuit decisionmakin§ and undermine the accountability and visibility of the
appellate judiciary. 16 Indeed, the chief judges of seven regional circuits, who
submitted public comments during November 1998 on the commissioners' tentative
draft report, delivered a caustic critique of the commission suggestions respecting
district court appellate panels, characterizing those recommendations as "flawed both
conceptually and practically."166
In short, lawmakers might evaluate closely, and consider authorizing,
certain actions apart from, or complementary to, the proposals regarding appeals
court experimentation previously assessed. However, legislators might find them
impractical or ineffective and, therefore reject a substantial number of those
measures that would apparently decrease the volume of cases which attorneys and
parties plan to pursue, and, failing that, which would directly address the appeals
actually brought in a consistent, coherent, prompt, economical and equitable
manner.
Several reasons suggest that senators and representatives, as well as the
federal judiciary, should implement the ideas enumerated above. The
recommendations constitute a cautious, constructive attempt to ascertain with
greater confidence whether the current situation of the Ninth Circuit in fact
requires remediation and, if so, to delineate potentially efficacious solutions. The
approach should treat the most troubling problems that the commissioners perceived
and the valid concerns that numerous federal appellate courts observersincluding many members of Congress who represent jurisdictions in the western
United States-have expressed about the Ninth Circuit. The proposals could
confirm the legitimacy of the commission determinations and of contested criticisms
that others have leveled at the appeals court. The suggestions correspondingly
ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, MEDIATION AND CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1997). For analyses of Alternative Dispute Resolution, sec
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 139, 187; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at
230.
164.
See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 131-32; MCKENNA, supra note
116, at 127-33. For analyses of these panels, see Dragich, supra note 146, at 58-62 and supra
notes 132, 140 and accompanying text.
165.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text. For analyses of other direct
responses, see BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 151-85, 229-86; Dragich, s11pra
note 146, at 49-52; 55-66; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 231-33, 236-38.
166.
EDWARDS ET AL., COMMENTS, supra note 25. The proposal rested on the

"flawed premise that cases are easily divisible into two categories"-error correction and
Jaw declaration-and would add another level of review for most cases, which would be
"expensive to litigants and unacceptable." It would burden the courts, might require more
"district judgeships for appellate purposes, which does not seem to be good public policy,"
and would engender "virtually monolithic opposition by district judges.'' Id.; accord
JUSTICE DEPT. COMMENTS, supra note 25.
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might help probe the effectiveness of the divisional arrangement developed by the
commissioners and of additional techniques, namely panels constituting fewer
than three appellate judges, which would apparently be responsive to docket
growth. This manner of proceeding should achieve certain, important commission
objectives, such as the promotion of uniformity and coherence, without disrupting
those aspects of Ninth Circuit administration that have facilitated the rather
expeditious, inexpensive and fair resolution of cases. The recommendations would
explicitly address several concerns, such as the need to rationalize federalization in an
appropriate fashion, and would accommodate a few commission ideas, namely the
notion of smaller, stabler decisional units. Some of the commissioners' goals, such
as fostering regionalism, which these prescriptions may only partially promote,
seem less significant. Of course, if the legislative or judicial branch decides to
effectuate the concepts proffered, implementation would limit the disadvantages
that the essentially untested divisional scheme could impose. Finally, should the
course of action outlined prove to be inadequate, the incremental, conservative
character of the approach minimizes the risks entailed and means that
comparatively little would have been lost, while lawmakers and judges can then
institute relatively radical mechanisms, if the techniques are indicated.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals carefully discharged its important responsibilities to analyze the appellate
court system and propose improvements in the circumscribed period which
lawmakers provided. However, insufficient empirical data support the
commissioners' findings and suggestions. As the twenty-first century opens,
therefore, the 107th Congress should authorize further study of the appeals courts
or should authorize Ninth Circuit experimentation with measures that promise to
enhance appellate court operations while rejecting the recently-reintroduced bills
to split the Ninth Circuit

